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Abstract
Overprecision—an excessive faith that one knows the truth—is both the most durable and least
understood form of overconfidence. This paper offers an approach to the study of overprecision
that has more in common with the way uncertainty affects our actions in everyday life and avoids
some methodological problems of other approaches. We measure the precision in judgment
implied by people’s tendency to adjust their point estimates of an uncertain quantity in response
to the costs of over- or underestimating the correct answer. The results reveal robust
overprecision. People adjust their estimates less than they should given their actual knowledge,
and this is driven by their subjective confidence.
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A Behavioral Demonstration of Overconfidence in Judgment
Overconfidence has been called the most pervasive and potent bias to which human
judgment is vulnerable (De Bondt & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2011). Of the various ways in
which overconfidence has been studied, the most robust and least understood is what (Moore &
Healy, 2008) call overprecision—excessive confidence that one knows the truth. Overprecision
has profound consequences, giving investors excessive confidence in how much an investment is
worth (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 2001), leading physicians to gravitate too quickly
to a particular diagnosis (Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981), and making us intolerant
of dissenting views (Harvey, 1997; Harvey & Fischer, 1997).
Using standard approaches, overprecision has proven remarkably resistant to debiasing
(Harvey, 1997; Soll & Klayman, 2004). This has led to concerns that overprecision may be a
methodological artifact (Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991). Researchers typically
study overprecision by asking people to specify 90% confidence intervals around some
numerical estimate (e.g., the length of the Nile River). These confidence intervals include the
truth as rarely as 30% of the time, suggesting people are behaving as if their knowledge was
more precise than it actually is (McKenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008; Soll & Klayman, 2004).1
One criticism of this approach is that it requires familiarity with probability and confidence
intervals—statistical concepts with which even well-educated people routinely make large errors
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1993).
A second criticism is that this approach bears little relationship to the way overprecision
affects people’s judgments in daily life. It is rare for people to have to specify confidence
intervals around some belief. When deciding what time to depart for a lunch meeting, one does
not consider a 90% confidence interval around the travel time. Instead, if punctuality is
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important, then uncertainty should lead one to depart earlier. Or because falling off a cliff is
worse than missing the great view, we keep back from the precipice. Every day, in hundreds of
different instances, we steer clear of metaphorical cliffs as a function of (1) the cost of erring on
each side and (2) our uncertainty. In this paper we manipulate these two factors to observe their
effects on people’s judgments. The first benefit of our approach is that it does not require us to
ask participants about probabilities, degrees of confidence, or confidence intervals. Second, our
approach parallels the way in which uncertainty affects judgment every day.
Our approach builds on that of Mamassian (2008) to test overprecision in declarative
knowledge. In our studies, people estimated the high temperature of cities on randomly selected
days. We gave them feedback on the accuracy of their estimates and rewarded them for
accuracy with lottery tickets toward a prize. The days were divided into three blocks of 24
judgments each, and each block featured a different payoff function (see Table 1). One block
featured symmetric payoffs, in which participants earned lottery tickets if their estimates were
close to the correct answer. The two other blocks featured asymmetric payoffs. In one,
participants earned lottery tickets only for correctly guessing or overestimating the answer; in the
other, participants earned lottery tickets only for correctly guessing or underestimating the
answer. These payoffs were designed to mimic the asymmetric costs of erring to one side
encountered in daily life.
To illustrate, imagine a person whose best guess of the high temperature in Pittsburgh on
March 10, 2006 is 10°C, but who also believes it could have ranged from 7°C to 12°C. Under
symmetric payoffs, in which the costs of over- and underestimation are identical, she should
guess 10°C. But because 7°C is also reasonable, she should increase her guess to, say, 13°C (an
adjustment of +3°C) if she is rewarded only for correctly guessing or overestimating the actual
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temperature. At the same time, however, she will only earn two tickets instead of five if she
overestimates by too much (see Table 1, Block 2). Thus to maximize earnings, her guess should
be close to the correct answer but not less. Note that confidence in one’s knowledge should
affect the degree to which one adjusts the estimates under asymmetric payoffs. If, for example, a
less confident person believes the temperature could have ranged from 5°C to 15°C, he should
make larger adjustments to his estimates (e.g., +5°C) to maximize his expected earnings.
We make two predictions about people’s behavior in this task. First, we expect people to
be overprecise: They will adjust their point estimates insufficiently. Experiments 1A and 1B
demonstrate this basic result. Second, we expect people’s confidence to moderate their
overprecision. Specifically, the more confidence people have in their point estimates, the less
they will adjust. We manipulate confidence in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1A
Method
We recruited 36 women and 28 men from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Mage = 25.6 years) to
participate in a study of judgment conducted at a local university. Participants were offered $5
and lottery tickets towards an iPod Shuffle for completing the study. Participants first provided
90% confidence intervals (90% CIs) for the high temperature in Pittsburgh (in °C or °F, at their
choosing) on 24 randomly-selected days in 2006–2007. This enabled us to compare traditional
measures of overprecision with ours. Following this, participants made point estimates of the
high temperature for 72 days, divided into three blocks of 24, and received trial-by-trial feedback
with the correct answers. Participants earned tickets for the accuracy of their estimates based on
the payoffs in each block, up to a maximum of 120 per block. Table 1 explains the payoffs. The
block with symmetric payoffs came first, followed by the two blocks with asymmetric payoffs,
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which were counterbalanced. Participants then answered questions about their knowledge of
Pittsburgh temperatures and their demographic characteristics, learned how they did, and were
dismissed.
Measures
We operationalized overprecision in the point estimates as the ratio between the observed
adjustment of each person’s estimates under asymmetric payoffs and a normative adjustment
which maximized the expected payoffs in those blocks (cf. Granger, 1969). The observed
adjustment for each person was his or her mean error (i.e., bias) in each block of estimates. We
expected people to bias their estimates upward when rewarded for overestimating the correct
answer (i.e., a positive average adjustment in Block 2) and to bias their estimates downward
when rewarded for underestimating the correct answer (i.e., a negative average adjustment in
Block 3). To identify the normative adjustment for each person, we asked a simple question:
How many more tickets would the participant have earned if he or she had added another X
degrees to the estimates, on average? We calculated these amounts for 201 values of X (viz., –
50°C, –49.5°C, …, +49.5°C, +50°C) in each of the asymmetric-payoff blocks. We then
averaged those values of X at which the simulated earnings exceeded the participant’s actual
earnings. This represented his or her normative adjustment (cf. Lawrence & O'Connor, 2005).2
Overprecision was indexed by the ratio of each person’s observed adjustment to the
normative adjustment, subtracted from 1. If the observed adjustment was less than the normative
adjustment, overprecision was greater than zero; if the observed adjustment was greater than the
normative adjustment, overprecision was less than zero—the person was underprecise; and if the
observed and normative adjustments were equal, overprecision equaled zero—the person was
neither under- nor overprecise. For example, if a person’s observed adjustment is +3°C, but he
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or she would have earned more with an average adjustment of +5°C (see Figure 1), the degree of
overprecision is .40 (= 1 – 3/5).
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analysis. Two point estimates exceeding 100°C were coded as entry errors
and excluded prior to the analysis. To check the manipulation of payoffs, we calculated the
observed adjustment of each person by block. Average adjustments (in °C) were 0.69, 95% CI
[0.25, 1.13], with symmetric payoffs; 4.93, 95% CI [4.35, 5.50], with positive payoffs for
overestimation; and –6.29, 95% CI [–6.88, –5.70], with positive payoffs for underestimation.
People adjusted (i.e., biased) their estimates as expected with this manipulation of payoffs.
Point estimates. Because differences between the two blocks with asymmetric payoffs
were not of substantive interest, we averaged the observed and normative adjustments (reversecoded as necessary) across blocks for each person before calculating overprecision. The average
level of overprecision was 0.33 (SD = 0.26), t(63) = 10.16, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.27.
Participants’ actual earnings under asymmetric payoffs (M = 118.69, SD = 12.06) were
significantly less than what they would have earned absent their overprecision (M = 125.05, SD
= 8.99), t(63) = 19.49, p < .001, d = 0.60.
Participants who made larger absolute errors under symmetric payoffs tended to make
larger adjustments to their point estimates under asymmetric payoffs (rs = .28, p = .024). In
other words, those less knowledgeable about Pittsburgh temperatures adjusted more, as they
should have. This suggests that confidence—knowledge of what we know (Russo &
Schoemaker, 1992)—was an important predictor of behavior.
Confidence intervals. On average, participants’ 90% CIs contained the correct answer
49% (SD = 24%) of the time, which replicates prior findings using this method. There was also

A BEHAVIORAL DEMONSTRATION OF OVERCONFIDENCE

7

correspondence in overprecision across the two methods. Fifty-four of the 64 participants were
overprecise in both their confidence intervals and point estimates, seven were overprecise only in
their confidence intervals, and three were overprecise only in their point estimates. Individuals
making the smallest adjustments to their point estimates constructed the narrowest 90% CIs (rs =
.43, p < .001).
Experiment 1B
Presenting the block with symmetric payoffs first in Experiment 1A provided people with
extensive feedback about their actual knowledge, which enabled them to make informed
judgments about how to adjust their estimates under asymmetric payoffs. However, it is possible
that people found it difficult to switch from making their best estimate of the temperature under
symmetric payoffs to making biased estimates under asymmetric payoffs. If so, this would
overstate the extent of overprecision. With this concern in mind, Experiment 1B
counterbalanced the order of the symmetric and asymmetric payoffs.
Method
We recruited 60 women and 42 men from Berkeley, California (Mage = 20.7 years) to
participate. Each was offered $10 and a chance to win $50 gift cards from an online retailer.
Participants guessed the high temperature in Berkeley (in °C or °F, at their choosing) on
randomly chosen days from 2006–2007. The procedure and measures were identical to that of
the prior experiment with two exceptions. First, we counterbalanced the order of the symmetric
and asymmetric payoffs. Second, participants completed the 90% CIs after their point estimates.
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Results and Discussion
Average adjustments (in °C) were –1.09, 95% CI [–1.34, –0.84], with symmetric payoffs;
2.79, 95% CI [2.46, 3.12], with positive payoffs for overestimation; and –2.84, 95% CI [–3.12, –
2.57], with positive payoffs for underestimation.
The average level of overprecision was 0.40 (SD = 0.26), t(101) = 15.82, p < .001, d =
1.57. Overprecision was marginally higher for the 53 participants who started with the
asymmetric payoffs (M = 0.45, SD = 0.26) than for the 49 participants who started with the
symmetric payoffs (M = 0.36, SD = 0.25), t(100) = 1.70, p = .092, d = 0.34. This suggests that
presenting the symmetric payoffs first, if anything, produced less overprecision.
Confidence intervals. On average, participants’ 90% CIs contained the correct answer
70% (SD = 18%) of the time. As in the prior study, individuals making the smallest adjustments
to their point estimates constructed the narrowest 90% CIs (rs = .38, p < .001). Of the 102
participants, 75 were overprecise in both their confidence intervals and point estimates, eight
were overprecise only in their confidence intervals, 18 were overprecise only in their point
estimates, and one was overprecise in neither task.
Experiment 2
Experiments 1A and 1B produced strong evidence of overprecision in judgments.
Experiment 2 demonstrates that confidence moderates people’s point-estimate adjustments. We
manipulated confidence directly by varying the feedback participants received (cf. Arkes,
Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; Stone & Opel, 2000). Specifically, participants received no
trial-by-trial feedback about their accuracy, authentic feedback (as in the prior experiments), or
exaggerated feedback. For those in the no-feedback and authentic-feedback conditions, we
expected to replicate the overprecision found in the first experiments. We expected those
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receiving exaggerated feedback to show the least overprecision.
Method
We recruited 107 women and 77 men from Berkeley, California (Mage = 20.5 years) to
participate. Each was offered $10 and a chance to win $25 gift cards from an online retailer.
The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1A with two exceptions. First, after
specifying their 90% CIs, participants were assigned to one of three conditions for the point
estimates. In the no-feedback condition, participants completed their point estimates without
trial-level or summary feedback about their errors; in the authentic-feedback condition,
participants received accurate trial-level feedback about their errors; and in the exaggeratedfeedback condition, participants received manufactured trial-level feedback about their errors.
The exaggerated feedback told participants their errors were approximately 2.5 times greater
than they actually were (e.g., if the actual error was +2°C, the feedback was +5°C). We selected
this exaggeration after estimating what feedback might have optimized accuracy in Experiments
1A and 1B.
Second, after making their point estimates under symmetric payoffs, all participants
provided subjective probability distributions of their errors based on the SPIES technique
(Haran, Moore, & Morewedge, 2010). They indicated, for every 100 temperature estimates, how
many of their errors would fall into each of nine intervals (viz., < –11°C, –10 to –8°C,…, +8 to
+10°C, > +11°C). After assigning frequencies to each interval, participants completed their
point estimates under asymmetric payoffs. Participants then answered questions about their
understanding of the task, their motivation, and their confidence, after which they learned their
performance and were dismissed.
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Measures
Overprecision was operationalized as in the prior experiments. We collected two
measures of participants’ confidence. The implicit measure was the subjective probability
distribution of their errors provided after the first block of point estimates. We expected
participants with less confidence to construct wider probability distributions (as measured by the
standard deviation of their distributions) than those with more confidence (Haran, et al., 2010).
The explicit measure of confidence was each person’s answer to the following question collected
at the end of the study: “How confident are you in your ability to accurately estimate Berkeley,
CA temperatures?” (0 = Not at all confident, 4 = Extremely confident).
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analysis. Four estimates exceeding 100°C in absolute value were dropped
as entry errors prior to analysis. In addition, three participants who made constant and extreme
estimates (for Berkeley, CA) under asymmetric payoffs (e.g., –18°C) were excluded from the
analysis, leaving a final sample of 181.3
Average adjustments (in °C) were –0.29, 95% CI [–0.47, –0.10], with symmetric payoffs;
3.78, 95% CI [3.40, 4.15], with positive payoffs for overestimation; and –3.21, 95% CI [–3.63, –
2.80], with positive payoffs for underestimation.
Confidence. The correlation between the two measures of confidence was –.41 (i.e.,
people with wider probability distributions also reported lower confidence). A multivariate
omnibus test rejected that feedback had no effect on confidence, F(4, 178) = 13.20, p < .001. As
Table 2 indicates, for both the subjective probability distributions, F(2, 178) = 16.33, p < .001, η2
= .15, and self-reported confidence, F(2, 178) = 18.28, p < .001, η2 = .17, participants in the nofeedback condition were most confident (i.e., had the narrowest probability distributions),
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followed by those in the authentic-feedback condition, followed by those in the exaggeratedfeedback condition.
Point estimates. The average level of overprecision was .29 (SD = .48), t(180) = 8.31, p
< .001, d = 0.62. Participants’ total earnings under asymmetric payoffs (M = 116.40, SD =
18.77) were significantly less than what they would have earned absent their overprecision (M =
128.86, SD = 12.35), t(180) = 17.81, p < .001, d = 0.79.
As expected, we reduced overprecision by manipulating confidence. Table 2 indicates
that participants receiving exaggerated feedback were significantly less overprecise than those
receiving either no feedback, t(178) = 3.91, p < .001, d = 0.59, or authentic feedback, t(178) =
4.95, p < .001, d = 0.74. In fact, overprecision in the exaggerated-feedback condition did not
differ statistically from zero, t(58) = 0.72, p = .47, d = 0.09.
People display overprecision in this task because they insufficiently adjust their point
estimates relative to their normative benchmarks—they step too close to the cliff’s edge. We
have argued these adjustments are affected by confidence: People who are less confident in their
expertise adjust more than people who are more confident. The data supported this claim.
Participants with wider subjective probability distributions made larger adjustments to their
subsequent point estimates (r = .37, p < .001) and were less overprecise (r = –.28, p < .001).
Confidence intervals. On average, participants’ 90% CIs contained the true answer 63%
(SD = 22%) of the time. This overprecision did not differ by condition, F(2, 178) = 0.91, p =
.405. Individuals making the smallest adjustments to their point estimates constructed the
narrowest 90% CIs (rs = .18, p = .018). Of the 181 participants, 121 were overprecise in both
their confidence intervals and point estimates, 37 were overprecise only in their confidence
intervals, 17 were overprecise only in their point estimates, and six were overprecise in neither
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task.
Discussion
The three experiments we report present evidence of overprecision in judgment using a
behavioral measure that (1) does not require an understanding of probabilities or confidence
intervals by research participants and (2) bears more similarity to the everyday decision contexts
that depend on confidence in judgment. The results suggest that overprecision is robust and is
not solely a product of unfamiliar elicitation methods (such as confidence intervals) that assume
too much about respondents’ statistical sophistication.
Yet two concerns persist. First, participants may have simply been insensitive to the
asymmetric payoffs. Anticipating this, we took measures to ensure participants understood the
task: They had to correctly answer three questions about the payoffs to demonstrate their
attention and understanding before starting each block, and the payoff function was summarized
at the top of the computer screen throughout the trials. Moreover, as reported above, participants
biased their estimates in the appropriate direction, and did so, on average, on the first trial of
each block. In short, participants understood their incentives (for additional evidence about
people's ability to respond to asymmetric payoffs, see Goodwin, 2005; Lawrence & O'Connor,
2005; Weber, 1994).
Second, even if they understood their payoffs, participants may have insufficiently
adjusted their estimates because they were anchored by their best estimate of the answer (Block
& Harper, 1991). In fact, verbal protocols from a supplementary study confirmed that they often
started with a best guess and adjusted from there. However, while anchoring processes may
have been at work, they cannot explain why (a) those with less expertise made greater
adjustments in Experiment 1A, (b) those with less confidence made greater adjustments in
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Experiment 2, and (c) overprecision was eliminated in Experiment 2 when people received
unflattering feedback about their accuracy. In sum, when asymmetric incentives lead people to
adjust their responses to one side or to the other of the best guess, the amount of adjustment
depends critically on how confident people are in the accuracy of their knowledge—the
subjective precision in their judgment. Excessive confidence is therefore key to participants’
failure to adjust sufficiently.
The new method we present has its limitations. It does not elicit direct measures of
confidence, and it is pedagogically less useful than traditional means of illustrating
overconfidence, such as confidence-interval estimation (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).
Nevertheless, it offers researchers an alternative to self-reports which rely on having to explain
probabilities or confidence intervals.
The consequence of all this overprecision is profound. It happens with some frequency
that people cut things too close—arriving late, missing planes, bouncing checks, or falling off
one of the many cliffs that present themselves to us in our daily lives. People also cling too
fervently to beliefs that are poorly supported by evidence, adjusting their beliefs too little in light
of the evidence or the consequences of being wrong. We hope that the methodology and the
evidence we present here will prove useful in elucidating the underlying sources of this excessive
faith in the accuracy of our own judgment.
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Footnotes
1

Elicitation methods that call explicit attention to a large range of outcomes can reduce

overprecision (see Haran, et al., 2010; Winman, Hansson, & Juslin, 2004), and, in some cases,
even cause underprecision (Bolger & Harvey, 1995; Goodwin, 2005).
2

We relied on each person’s empirical distribution of errors for each payoff function to

identify his or her normative adjustment rather than make parametric assumptions about those
distributions, such as normality or invariance across payoff functions. As one reviewer pointed
out, however, our method does assume that the distributions would not otherwise materially
change if people made smaller or larger adjustments. We used data from Experiment 1B to
investigate this. First, p-values provided by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the
distribution of errors between payoff functions for each person ranged from .14 to 1.00. Thus
aside from their obvious differences in location, these error distributions were statistically
equivalent (at an alpha of .10) across payoff functions. Second, we assessed whether any
differences in these error distributions, as indexed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic D,
were related to differences in participants’ observed adjustments for each payoff function. This
correlation was 0.15 (p = .146). In sum, differences between the error distributions across
asymmetric payoff functions were minor and weakly related to differences in the observed
adjustments.
3

These three participants also reported significantly less motivation, F(1, 182) = 3.64, p

= .058, and spent significantly less time on the task, F(1, 183) = 8.16, p = .005, than the other
participants.
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Table 1
Number of Lottery Tickets Earned, as a Function of Accuracy
Estimate (relative to actual temperature)

Block

Payoff

More
than 6°C
below

6 to 0°C
below

0 to 6°C
above

More
than 6°C
above

1

Equal reward for
positive and negative
errors

0

5

5

0

2

No reward for negative
errors; reward for
positive errors

0

0

5

2

3

No reward for positive
errors; reward for
negative errors

2

5

0

0

Note. Perfect estimates always earned five tickets. Because temperatures are less variable in
Berkeley than in Pittsburgh, we reduced the cutoff from 6°C to 4°C in Experiments 1B and 2.
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Table 2
Effects of Feedback on Beliefs and Overprecision in Experiment 2
Beliefs

Adjustments

SD
of SPD

Self-reported
confidence

Observed

Normative

Overprecision

Condition

n

No
feedback

64

1.61
(0.56)

2.16
(0.93)

2.79
(1.88)

5.02
(1.47)

0.41
(0.51)

Authentic
feedback

58

1.70
(0.43)

2.05
(0.91)

2.74
(1.07)

5.14
(1.52)

0.42
(0.28)

Exaggerated
feedback

59

2.08
(0.46)

1.24
(0.90)

5.00
(2.66)

5.71
(1.70)

0.05
(0.51)

Overall

181

1.79
(0.53)

1.82
(1.00)

3.50
(2.23)

5.28
(1.59)

0.29
(0.48)

Note. Means reported with standard deviations in parentheses. SPD = Subjective probability
distribution.
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Figure 1. A stylized representation of overprecision in judgment. The solid line plots a
hypothetical person’s observed distribution of errors in response to payoffs which reward
overestimation; on average this person added +3 to her estimates. The double line identifies the
average adjustment which maximizes her expected payoffs, which in this case is +5. The percent
difference between the observed and normative adjustments represents overprecision. The
dashed line plots the person’s belief about her errors implied by the observed adjustment. (Note,
we do not assume normality when calculating overprecision.)

